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Abstract  
This paper investigates the long-run and short-run effects of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
foreign aid and migrant remittances on economic growth in 36 African countries over the period 
1980–2016. Empirical evidence is based on Pooled Mean Group (PMG) approach. The 
following findings are established. First, while there is a positive and significant long-run 
relationship between foreign direct investment and economic growth in Africa as a whole, the 
effect of remittances and foreign aid is insignificant. Second, in the short-run there is no 
evidence of any significant impact of FDI, remittances and foreign aid on economic growth. 
Third,  results are still  robust in the short-run when the panel is  divided in three subsamples.  
However, in the long-run the effects of FDI, remittances and foreign aid on economic growth 
depend on the income level. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, several African countries have achieved higher economic growth rates. 
However, the challenge for these countries lies in their ability to sustain this growth in the long 
run. With a very low level of savings compared to other regions and declining tax revenues, 
African governments are banking on external sources of finance. Among the sources of funding 
sought are foreign direct investment (FDI), migrant remittances and official development 
assistance (ODA) in that order of importance and volume.  
These external sources of finance have been proved to play an important role in boosting 
economic growth and development (Almfraji et al. 2014). Indeed, FDI, Remittances and ODA 
to  developing  countries  were  respectively  estimated  to  be  roughly  US$ 810  billion  in  
2016 (UNCTAD 2017),  US$ 429 billion in 2015 (World Bank 2017) and US$ 142.6 in 2016 
(OCDE 2017)  (see Figure 1 which despites the trend of the average level of the external 
financial flows for 140 developing countries from 1980 to 2016). However, despite their 
increased importance and volume, the combined impact of FDI, remittances and foreign aid on 
economic growth is not considered sufficiently studied, particularly for African countries. To 
fill this gap, this paper investigates the dynamic effect of FDI, migrant remittances and foreign 
aid on economic growth in African countries. 
This paper makes important contributions to the empirical literature on the link between FDI, 
remittances, foreign aid and economic growth by answering the following questions: Do FDI, 
remittances and foreign aid really spur more economic growth in African countries? Is there a 
temporary or permanent effects of FDI, remittances and foreign aid on economic growth? Some 
past studies have tried to answer the first question (Nwaogu and Ryan 2015; Driffield and Jones 
2013). However, our work differs from those previous studies in two respects. First, we 
contribute to the debate by modelling the possibly long-run and short-run relationship between 
FDI, remittances, foreign aid and economic growth in Africa. We use a methodology that, to 
the  best  of  our  knowledge,  has  not  yet  been  used  before  for  the  combine  effect  of  FDI,  
remittances and foreign aid on economic growth in African countries. We employ the Pooled 
Mean group (PMG) estimator. This method allow us to control for panel heterogeneity and to 
distinguish between long-run and short-run effect. Second, we investigate whether the 
relationship between FDI, remittances, foreign aid and economic growth varies with the level 
of economic development. For this purpose, we divide our sample in three panel data, namely: 
Low income countries, lower-middle-income and upper middle income for the period 1980-
2016. Results show that while in the long-run foreign direct investment promote economic 
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growth, the effect in non-significant in the short-run. Additionally, results suggest that the 
effects of foreign aid and remittances is non-significant both in the long-run and short-run. 
 
Figure 1. Average level of remittances, foreign aid and FDI to developing countries, 1980-
2016 (billions of dollars) 
 
Source: World Development Indicator (2017) 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 introduces the methodology and data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
analysis. Finally, the conclusion and policy recommendations are presented in Section 5. 
2. Literature review 
The literature review shows that the relationships among FDI, foreign aid, remittances and 
economic growth can be broadly classi?ed into three research clusters. First, the empirical 
works focusing on the relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth. Second, 
analyses focusing on the Aid–growth nexus, and third, analyses focusing on the Remittances–
growth nexus. Nevertheless, for African countries, few number of studies have analysed the 
combined effects of FDI, remittances and foreign aid on economic growth, particularly in the 
context of the long-run and short-run relationship. 
2.1. FDI- growth nexus  
Because of the potential economic bene?ts of foreign direct investment, such as increases 
competitiveness, Job creation, transfer of technology and most importantly economic growth 
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earnings (Borensztein et al. 1998; Karlsson et al. 2007; Omri and Sassi-Tmar 2015; Sothan, 
2017; Makiela and Ouattara 2018), many African governments have implemented various 
policies incentives to attract more foreign direct investment. Analysing the relationship between 
FDI and economic growth has been one of hotly debated topic. However, researchers have 
reached mixed results.  
Empirical studies have shown inconsistent or even contradictory results in terms of a FDI-
led economic growth hypothesis. For example, Borensztein et al. (1998) analyses the effect of 
FDI on growth. From a sample of 69 developing countries over the period 1970-1989 and based 
on the Romer model, the authors seek to account for the mechanisms underlying technology 
transfer. They conclude that FDI is an important channel for technology transfer. Moreover, 
they show empirically that FDI has a positive impact on economic growth only if the level of 
education of the population exceeds a given threshold. Borensztein et al. (1998) estimate that it 
is from the threshold 0.52 year for high school that FDI begins to drive economic growth gains 
in the host country. As a result, the positive influence of FDI on host economies would depend 
on their interactions with human capital. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) show that the 
benefits  of  FDI  for  host  countries  require  adequate  human  capital,  political  and  economic  
stability, and a liberalized market environment. Lumbila (2005); Li and Liu (2005) go in the 
same direction and give prominence to human capital as prerequisite for  positive and 
significant impact of FDI on the economic growth of host countries. 
Gui-Diby (2014) investigates the impact of FDI on the growth rate of 50 African countries 
over the period 1980-2009 and finds that FDI has a direct positive and significant impact on the 
growth  rate.  On the  other  hand,  he  does  not  find  the  links  highlighted  by  Borensztein  et  al.  
(1998) between FDI, human capital and economic growth. Alfaro et al. (2009) show that human 
capital is not an important channel for technology transfer. The direct effects of FDI on 
economic growth are supported by the work of Ram and Zhang (2002); Campos and Kinoshita 
(2002); Hoang et al (2010); Kotrajaras (2010) and Gumby et al. (2017). These authors, while 
using different methods and samples, come to a similar conclusion: FDI contributes to 
economic growth, regardless of any prior level of human capital.  
Others studies claim that the impacts of FDI on economic growth depend on its interaction 
with financial market development (Alfaro et al. 2004; Choong et al. 2004; Hermes and Lensink 
2003), governance quality (Agbloyor et al. 2016), institution quality (Jude and Levieuge 2017; 
Bouchoucha and Benammou 2018) and economic freedom (Azman-Saini et al. 2010). 
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2.2. Remittances – growth nexus  
In terms of remittances - growth nexus, many studies have investigated the effects of 
remittances on economic growth with mixed results. These studies can be divided in two stands. 
Positive effects and negative effects.  
With regard to positive growth effects of remittances, several studies have reported evidence 
on the positive impact of remittances on economic growth through their positive impact on 
consumption, savings, or investment. Meyer and Shera (2017) and Goschin (2013) show that 
remittances contribute positively to economic growth. Based on a sample of six high 
remittances receiving countries, namely, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldava, Romania and 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Meyer and Shera (2017) estimate a standard growth model and find that 
remittances have a positive impact on economic growth and that this impact increases at higher 
levels of remittances relative to GDP. Similarly, Nsiah and Fayissa (2013) investigate the 
relationship between remittances and economic growth in a panel of 64 different countries of 
Africa, Asian and Latin American- Caribbean from 1987-2007. By using panel full modified 
least square estimator, they found that there is positive and significant relationship between 
remittances and economic growth throughout the whole group. Nyamongo et al. (2012) 
investigate the role of remittances and ?nancial development on economic growth in a panel of 
36 countries in Africa over the period 1980 –2009. They found that remittances are an important 
source of growth for these countries during the study period.  Moreover, remittances represent 
a source of savings and thus provide additional capital for investment in Health, education and 
entrepreneurship (Rao and Hassan 2012; Anton 2010; Yang 2008; Woodruff & Zenteno 2007), 
all of which have an effect on productivity, employment and finally on economic growth. 
Recently, Williams (2018) investigates the effect of remittances on a large panel of 109 
developing countries and found that remittances promote growth in countries with good quality 
democratic institutions. The role of institutions on the relationship between remittances and 
economic growth is confirmed by Zghid et al. (2016) in the case of North African countries.  
The positive growth effect of remittances is confirmed in several other studies (Olubiyi 2014; 
Imai et al. 2014; Salahuddin and Gow 2015). 
Conversely, other studies have pointed out negative or insignificant effects of remittances 
on economic growth. According to Gupta et al. (2007), remittances are neither a panacea nor a 
substitute for a sustained and domestically engineered development endeavour for curing the 
problem of low- income countries. Based on that, remittances can appreciate the real exchange 
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rate in the host economies and therefore generate a resource allocation from the tradable to the 
non-tradable sector (Acosta et al. 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2004). Moreover, a large 
part of remittances received in less developed countries are spent on consumption likely to be 
dominated by foreign goods than on productive investment. Therefore these remittances 
undermine productivity and growth (Ahlburg 1991). Additionally, some authors argue that 
remittances may reduce recipients’ motivation to work, creating permanent ?nancial 
dependency, and slowing down economic growth (Chami et al. 2003). For Elu and Price (2012), 
remittances can be used to finance terrorism, therefore inhibiting economic growth. Other 
studies have found a non-significant effects of remittances on economic growth. Ahamada and 
Coulibaly (2013) applied a panel Granger causality testing approach that is based on seemingly 
unrelated regressions systems and Wald tests with country-specific bootstrap critical values on 
20 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980–2007. They found that in any Sub-
Saharan African country, there is no causality between remittances and growth. The reasons is 
that  remittances  do  not  increase  physical  capital  investment.  Several  others  studies  have  
reported a negative or insignificant effects of remittances on economic growth (Roa and Hassan 
2011; Le 2009). 
 
2.3. Foreign aid – growth nexus  
Foreign  aid  is  a  major  source  of  economic  growth  to  developing  countries, especially in 
Africa. However, empirical evidences are still inconclusive and somewhat con?icting about the 
economic role of foreign aid. There  are  two  strands  of the literature  on  the  role  of  foreign  
aid   on   economic  growth.  The  first  stand  claim that  foreign  capital  inflow is  necessary  and  
sufficient to sustain economic growth in the less developed countries. Example of studies in 
line with positive effects of foreign aid are Irandoust and Ericson (2005); Chatterjee et al. 
(2003). Irandoust and Ericson (2005) investigate the relationship between foreign aid, domestic 
saving and economic growth in a panel of African countries over the period 1965-2000. They 
find  that  foreign  aid  and  domestic  saving  enhance  economic  growth  for  all  countries  in  the  
sample. Chatterjee et al. (2003) indicate that foreign aid can contribute to economic growth 
only if it is used to finance public productive services. Liu et al. (2014) investigate the growth 
effect of foreign aid using an endogenous growth model. They found that a rise in the allocation 
of aid can increase the growth rate of the economy. Recently, Kargo and Sen (2014) suggests 
that foreign aid have positive effects on pro-poor growth in Sierra Leone. Based on a regional 
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spatial panel vector-autoregressive model, Civelli et al. (2018) found that foreign aid has a 
significant positive and persistent effects on economic growth in Uganda. 
The  second  group of studies  argue  that  foreign aid  has  negative effects  on the  economic  
growth  of  recipient  countries. Mallik (2008) examines the effectiveness of foreign aid for 
economic growth in the six poorest and highly aid dependent African countries, namely the 
Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. Using cointegration 
analysis, he demonstrates that in five out of the six countries, the natural log of foreign aid as a 
percentage of real GDP has a significant negative long run effect on the natural log of real GDP 
per capita. In the short run aid growth has no significant effect on economic growth per capita 
for most of the countries except for Niger. Sothan (2018) investigates the effect of foreign aid 
on economic growth in Cambodia over the period 1980-2014, using the autoregressive 
distributive lag (ARDL). He found that foreign aid has negative and significant impact on 
economic growth in the long-run. These negative results are consistent with several past and 
recent studies (Ang 2010; Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Ali and Isse 2005). 
After this literature review, it is clear that there are some inconclusive and mixed results 
concerning the relationships among FDI, foreign Aid, remittances and economic growth. This 
paper contributes to the literature by assessing the short-run and long-run relationship between 
FDI, remittances, foreign aid and economic growth in African countries. 
3. Data and methodology  
3.1. Data  
The dataset used in this paper includes 38 African countries and comprises annual information 
covering the 1980-2016 period. The choice of time period and countries is dictated by data 
availability. Complete list of countries as well as variables definitions and sources are provided 
in the appendices. In this paper we use GDP per capita to proxy economic growth. Our 
independent  variables  are  foreign  direct  investment  flows  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  (FDI),  
remittances as percentage of GDP and Official development assistance as percentage of GNI 
(ODA). To ensure that our results are not bias, two control variables are included in the 
relationship between foreign direct investment, remittances, foreign aid and economic growth 
namely: financial development measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP (M2) and trade 
openness, measured by the sum of export and import as a percentage of GDP (Openness). All 
variables are in log transformed. Thus coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. 
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics, while Table 2 provides correlation matrix between 
all variables.  It  is  apparent  from  the summary  statistics  that  the  variables  are  comparable  
from  the  perspective  of  mean  values. Corresponding standard deviations show substantial 
variations. Therefore, we can be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would be obtained 
from the regressions. We notice from correlation matrix that foreign direct investment is 
positively correlated with GDP per capita, while remittances and foreign aid are negatively 
correlated to GDP per capita. Moreover, the correlation between FDI, Remittances and foreign 
aid is positive. 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
3.2. Methodology  
To investigate the long-run effects of foreign direct investment, remittances and foreign aid on 
economic growth, it is common to estimate the following basic regression: 
1 2 3 4 5Reit it it it it itGrowth FDI m ODA X? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?                                                   (1) 
Table 1.  Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
GDP per capita  7.010982 1.005254 4.751814 9.544209 1025 
FDI 4.44389 .5281003 -12.28028 5.149632 1026 
Remittances .3298011 1.734004 -5.638107 5.120576 980 
ODA 1.711541 1.3749 -17.0066 5.258985 1026 
M2 3.399999 .6108481 .7856608 4.773511 1013 
Openness 4.170762 .454521 2.405814 5.740935 955 
Note: All variable are log transformed 
  GDP per cap  FDI Remittances ODA M2 Openness 
GDP per cap  1.0000 0.0669* -0.1463* -0.6481* 0.6110* 0.4487* 
FDI  1.0000 0.1392* 0.0804* -0.0508 0.3495* 
Remittances   1.0000 0.1630* 0.1227* 0.0699 
ODA    1.0000 -0.4256* -0.1609* 
M2     1.0000 0.4231* 
Openness           1.0000 
Note: *, indicates significance at 10% 
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Where itGrowth  equals the growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)  of country 
i at time t, itFDI  is foreign direct investment, Re itm   is  equal  to  remittances  over  GDP ,  
itODA is equal to official development assistance over GNI, itX  stand  for  a  set  of  control  
variables, and  it?  is the error term. 
Traditional estimations methods used to estimate equation (1) does not allow us to capture 
potential rich economic growth adjustment dynamic. For this reason, this paper investigates the 
dynamic  link  between  FDI,  remittances,  foreign  aid  and  economic  growth  by  using  a  panel  
ARDL specification. This method is interesting for several reasons. First, it allows us to control 
for heterogeneity in the relationship between these variables across countries by including 
individual-specific effects. Second, it allows us to control for endogeneity. Third, this model 
facilitates estimation of long-run and short-run effects of FDI, remittances, foreign aid and 
economic growth  
According to the study of Pesaran and Shin (1996), the following basic ARDL (p;q) model 
will be considered as the main equation; 
'
, , , ,
1 0
p q
it i j i t j i j i t j i it
j j
y y x? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?                                                                                      (2) 
Where 1,2,...,i N?  is country index, 1,2,...,t T? is a time index, j is the number of time 
lags, ity = economic growth, ,i tx  is a vector of foreign direct investment, remittances and 
foreign aid, and i? denotes country specific fixed effects. 
In order to consider the long run coefficient and the adjustment coefficient, equation (2) is re-
parameterized as follow: 
? ? ,
1 1
' * *'
1 , , , ,
1 0
i j
p q
it i it i i t i t j i j i t j i it
j j
y y x y x? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?                                              (3) 
Where i? represents the long-run or equilibrium relationship between ity  and ,i tx . ,
*
i j
? and *',i j?
represent  the  short-run  coefficients  relating  to  economic  growth  to  its  past  values  and  other  
determinants ,i tx . The error correction coefficient is given by i?  and measures the speed of 
adjustment of economic growth toward its long-run equilibrium following a change in FDI, 
remittances and foreign aid. A long-run relationship between independent variables and 
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economic growth exists if 0i? ? . Consequently, a significant and negative value of i? confirm 
the existence of co-integration between ity  and ,i tx . 
To estimate Equation (3), three different dynamic panel methods are usually used, namely: 
the mean group (MG) estimator developed by Pesaran and smith (1995), the pooled mean-group 
(PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999) and the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) 
estimator. Nevertheless, with the dynamic fixed-effect estimator, there is a difference in 
intercepts across groups, but all slope coefficients and error variances are homogeneous. 
According to Pesaran and smith (1995), estimated coefficients in DFE are affected by a 
potential serious heterogeneity bias, especially in small country sample, under slope 
homogeneity. To resolve this problem, Pesaran et al. (1999) propose the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimator as an alternative to DFE. PMG restricts the long-run parameters  to  be  
identical  over  the  cross  section,  but  allows  the intercepts, short-run coef?cients and error 
variances to differ across groups on the cross section. If the long-run homogeneity restrictions 
are valid, MG estimates will be inef?cient. Then, the maximum likelihood-based PMG 
approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) will yield a more ef?cient estimator. 
 
4. Empirical results  
This section presents the results of panel unit root test and Pooled Mean Group estimations. 
4.1. Unit root test 
Before applying ARDL estimation, we must determine the order of integration. For this aim; 
we used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Fisher Chi-square (ADF Fisher),   Phillips- Perron Fisher 
(PP) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) unit root tests. Results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Panel Units test 
  ADF-test   PP-test   IPS-test 
  Level 
First 
difference   Level 
First  
difference   Level First differences 
GDP 68.259 298.188***  115.587 767.268***  3.874 -18.973*** 
FDI 145.245*** 422.439***  87.378 711.900***  -0.179 -15.348*** 
REMIT 172.590*** 539.184***  283.039*** 1053.23***  -5.6303*** -33.573*** 
ODA 58.773 228.783***  81.456 458.389***  9.469 -18.942*** 
M2              54.528 128.896***  71.335 358.379***  7.984 -19.258*** 
Trade         87.639 383.495***    125.862***   792.725***   -2.2369 -19.412*** 
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It is obvious from the ADF test results that, some of our variables are integrated of I(0) or I(1). 
Thus, the unit root test results of individual effect show that FDI and Remittances are I(0), while 
GDP, ODA, M2 and Trade are I(1). 
4.2. Baseline estimations 
Empirical results are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Table 4 presents the results of the 
estimations of long-run and short-run effects of FDI, remittances and foreign aid on economic 
growth by using successively PMG, MG and DFE. Table 5 displays the robustness by including 
two control variables. In Table 6, we split the sample into low-income, lower-middle-income 
and upper-middle- income subsamples according to 2017 World Bank Classification, and redo 
the estimation procedures for each income group. 
Table 4. The effect of FDI, Remittances and ODA on economic growth 
Dependent variable : Log of GDP per capita 
  PMG MG Hausman test DFE 
Long-run coefficients 
FDI 0.748*** 0.466 0.99 0.175** 
 (0.078) (0.146) [0.1258] (0.108) 
Remittances 0.00815 0.0637  0.215** 
 (0.0112) (0.0602)  (0.0947) 
ODA -0.349 -0.207  -0.212 
 (0.139) (0.224)  (0.102) 
Error correction term   
Phi -0.0348*** -0.151***  -0.0259*** 
 (0.00927) (0.0356)  (0.00819) 
Short-run coefficients 
D.FDI 0.0757 0.111  0.00714 
 (0.0797) (0.113)  (0.0386) 
D.Remittances -0.0134 -0.0135  -0.0134 
 (0.00633) (0.00571)  (0.00260) 
D.ODA -0.00263 -0.00121  0.00129 
 (0.00759) (0.00684)  (0.00206) 
Constant -0.754*** -0.546  -0.160 
 (0.206) (0.740)  (0.161) 
Observations 941 941   941 
Note: The values in the parentheses are the standard error [p-value] of corresponding coefficients estimates. 
***, **, and * denote a significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 As we said above, Table 4 displays the short-run and long-run effect of FDI, remittances 
and foreign aid on economic growth. For this purpose, three alternative dynamic methods are 
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used, PMG, MG and FDE. However, according to Hausman test and its consistency and 
efficiency over MG and DFE when the long-run homogeneity restriction holds and the short-
run adjustments are expected to vary across countries (Kim et al. 2010), our analysis is based 
on PMG. Globally, in the long-run, foreign direct investment positively affect economic growth 
in Africa. However, the coefficient of FDI is significant for PMG and DFE estimators and non-
significant for MG.  The long-run coefficients of FDI in the PMG and DFE estimators are 0.748 
and 0.175 respectively. This result implies that a 1 percent increase in FDI leads to a 0.748% 
and 0.175% increase in economic growth, meaning that FDI inflows in African countries spur 
economic  growth.  This  result  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  FDI  inflows  is  seen  as  an  
important sources of savings and capital accumulation for African countries, creating positive 
spillovers, improving human capital, providing African countries access to advanced 
technologies and thus lead more economic growth (Iamsiraroj and Uluba???lu 2015). This 
result is consistent with several past studies on FDI - growth nexus (Malikane and Chitambara 
2017; Gui-Diby 2014; Driffield and Jones 2013). 
With regard to remittances, the coefficients are positive and non-significant for PMG and 
MG, but positive and significant in DFE. This results implies that in long-run, remittances 
receive do not have any significant effect on economic growth. According to Chami et al. (2010) 
the impact of remittances on economic is non-significant in the long-run because remittances  
are  often  transferred through informal channels such as friends and family members travelling 
abroad, or informal money-transfer networks such as the “hawala” system.  According to the 
World Bank (2011) more than 50 percent of the remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is through 
the informal channels. Therefore this poses a major challenge in getting a near accurate estimate 
of the magnitude of remittances. Our result is consistent with Rao and Hassan (2011); 
Alkhathlan (2013); Fenny et al. (2013); Lim and Simmons (2015) and Nwaogu and Ryan, 
2015).  
 In terms of foreign aid- growth nexus, the coefficient of ODA is negative and non-significant 
in all the three estimators. Implying that foreign aid receive by African countries do not enhance 
economic growth in the long-run. This result is in line with some past studies (Dhakal et al. 
1996; Adedokun 2017). Several factors can justify this result: first, the dependence of some 
African countries for help. As a result of receiving a lot of help from international organizations, 
African countries, especially the poorest, have become very dependent. As growth faltered 
despite massive aid flows, foreign aid has bound them into a debt trap (Mallik 2008). Second, 
corruption, poor governance and mismanagement of aid received: for several African countries, 
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the aid received was intended for investment projects because of the low level of savings of 
these countries. However, in reality, some of these funds are diverted for personal purposes. 
Thirdly, aid received by some African countries is for humanitarian causes, in order to manage 
natural disasters, food and security crises and therefore cannot promote economic growth. 
 
Table 5. The effect of FDI, Remittances and ODA on economic growth with control variables 
Dependent variable : Log of GDP per capita 
  PMG MG Hausman test DFE 
Long-run coefficients   
FDI 0.241*** 0.107 2.54 0.248** 
 (0.042) (0.136) [0.6523] (0.280) 
Remittances 0.146 0.156  0.0829* 
 (0.0177) (0.112)  (0.0430) 
ODA -0.322 -0.141  -0.112** 
 (0.282) (0.198)  (0.0564) 
Financial development 0.411*** 0.255  0.225 
 (0.0495) (0.217)  (0.159) 
Trade Opennes 0.422*** 0.362*  0.290 
 (0.0491) (0.128)  (0.187) 
Error correction term     
Phi -0.0474*** -0.236***  -0.0470*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0476)  (0.0101) 
Short-run coefficients     
D.FDI -0.0683 -0.165  -0.00857 
 (0.0683) (0.128)  (0.0428) 
D.Remittances -0.0208* -0.00197*  -0.0104*** 
 (0.0169) (0.00621)  (0.00268) 
D.ODA 0.00540 0.000588  0.00192 
 (0.00582) (0.00527)  (0.00213) 
D.(Financial development) -0.0316 -0.0780***  -0.0481*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0272)  (0.0122) 
D.(Trade Openness) -0.00192 -0.00658  -0.0451*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0152)  (0.0121) 
Constant -0.242*** -0.144  -0.205 
 (0.0691) (0.896)  (0.184) 
Observations 869 869   869 
Note : The values in the parentheses are the standard error [p-value] of corresponding coefficients 
estimates. ***, **, and * denote a significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
The short-run coefficients tell a different story. As said above, short-run coefficients are 
not restricted to be the same across countries, so that we do not have a single pooled estimate 
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for each coefficient. We find that relationship between FDI and economic growth and between 
foreign aid and economic growth are negative and non-significant in short-run. Moreover, the 
relationship between remittances and economic growth is positive but still non-significant. 
Thus, comparing the long- and short-run estimates, a first broad conclusion is that the 
relationship between FDI, Remittances, foreign aid and economic growth in Africa depends on 
whether their movements are temporary (short-run) or permanent (long-run).  
 
4.3. Robustness check  
We confront our results in terms of alternative explanations for our model. For this purpose, we 
evaluate our results by including more control namely: GDP per capita and trade openness. 
Results from PMG, MG and DFE are reported in Table 5. Using the ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1) results 
in Table 5 reinforce our previous findings in Table 4. This results confirm that the effect of FDI 
on economic growth is positive and statistically significant in the long-run and non-significant 
in the short-run.  Results in Table 5 show that a 1 percent increase in foreign direct investment 
leads to 0.241% and 0.248% increase in economic growth respectively for PMG and DFE 
estimation methods. The effects of remittances and foreign aid on economic growth are non-
significant both in long-run and short-run. Moreover, the error-correction terms still have a 
negative and significant coefficients.  
4.4. The effect of economic development level  
We  saw  in  Table  4  and  5  that  the  effects  of  FDI,  remittances  and  foreign  aid  on  economic  
growth depends on whether their movements are temporary or permanent. We now investigate 
if the relationship between these variables depends on the level of economic development. For 
this purpose, we split the sample into three subgroups, namely: lower-income, lower-middle- 
income and upper-middle – income subsamples according to 2017 World Bank Classification. 
The estimated coefficients from PMG, MG and DFE are displayed in Table 6.  
When looking at the long-run coefficients, FDI have positive and significant effects on 
economic growth in most subgroups except for Low-income where the impact of FDI on growth 
is positive but non-significant. This result implies that the impact of FDI on economic growth 
is positive in countries with relative higher income. The coefficient of FDI is 0.022 and 0.009 
in lower-middle income and upper-middle income countries respectively, suggesting that the 
long-run effect of FDI on economic growth decreases when the level of income is high.
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Table 6.  FDI, Remittances, Foreign aid and economic growth by income level 
  Low-income   Lower-midlle-income   Upper-midlle-income 
  PMG MG DFE   PMG MG DFE   PMG MG DFE 
Long-run coefficients            
FDI 0.092 0.034 0.077*  0.022*** 0.031 0.0122**  0.009* -0.037 0.079* 
 (0.022) (1.171) (0.0050)  (0.0075) (0.302) (0.189)  (0.0016) (0.106) (0.093) 
Remittances 0.0246** 0.000905* 0.0201*  -0.0677 -0.0043 -0.0062  -0.131 0.0225 0.208 
 (0.0268) (0.0506) (0.109)  (0.0408) (0.160) (0.193)  (0.0334) (0.0646) (0.771) 
ODA -0.561*** -0.176** -0.0834  -0.204*** -0.244 -0.282*  -0.078 -0.263 -0.265 
 (0.0658) (0.0812) (0.192)  (0.0438) (0.171) (0.169)  (0.0148) (0.381) (0.800) 
Hausman test 0.56[0.6324]   0.28[0.1423]    0.38[0.6941]   
Error correction term            
Phi -0.0232*** -0.244*** -0.0426**  -0.0410*** -0.0696** -0.0216**  -0.0278*** -0.0550*** -0.0073** 
 (0.0178) (0.0664) (0.0174)  (0.0139) (0.0282) (0.00872)  (0.0185) (0.0109) (0.0198) 
Short-run coefficients            
D.FDI -0.0163 -0.202 0.0418  -0.0808 0.0441 0.00603  -0.200 -0.218 -0.00572 
 (0.135) (0.216) (0.0724)  (0.0847) (0.102) (0.0517)  (0.262) (0.270) (0.118) 
D.Remittances -0.0222 -0.0173* -0.0200  -0.00670 -0.0119 -0.00665*  -0.000577 -0.00427 -0.00185 
 (0.0120) (0.00992) (0.00456)  (0.00631) (0.00918) (0.00401)  (0.0110) (0.00956) (0.00398) 
D.ODA -0.0159 -0.0127 -0.0372***  0.00977 0.00672 0.00308  0.0384 0.0176 0.00183 
 (0.0152) (0.0120) (0.00963)  (0.00834) (0.00902) (0.00431)  (0.0214) (0.0139) (0.00160) 
Constant -0.0855** -0.592* -0.111**  -1.092*** -0.160** 0.220**  -2.562* -1.756** -1.139* 
 (0.0877) (0.425) (0.288)  (0.377) (0.719) (0.211)  (1.720) (1.667) (0.585) 
Observations 428 428 428   337 337 337   126 126 126 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita. The values in the parentheses are the standard error [p-value] of corresponding coefficients estimates. ***, **, and * denote a 
significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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This result is consistent with previous studies, which demonstrate that countries with good 
institutions quality experience better growth performance (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2006; 
Nawaz 2015). The long-run effect of remittances on economic growth is globally consistent 
with results in Table 4 and 5 except for low- income countries, where the effect is positive and 
significant.  For aid-growth relationship, the long-run coefficients are globally negative and 
significant except in upper-middle income.  
The  short-run  coefficients  of  FDI,  remittances  and  foreign  aid  are  different  from the  
long-run coefficients.  The impact of FDI, Foreign aid and remittances on economic growth are 
insignificant in all subsamples. Suggesting that in the short run FDI, foreign aid and remittances 
received by African countries are not sufficient to enhance economic growth. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper empirically investigates the long-run and short-run effects of foreign direct 
investment, remittances and foreign aid received by 38 African countries over the period 1980-
2016. Empirical evidence is based on Pooled Mean group (PMG) estimator. The following 
findings are established. First, in the long-run, while FDI have a positive and significant effect 
on  economic  growth,  remittances  and  foreign  aid  do  not  have  any  significant  effects  on  
economic growth in Africa as a whole. In the short-run FDI, remittances and foreign aid do not 
have any significant effect on economic growth in African countries as a whole. 
To verify if the relationship between FDI, remittances, foreign aid and economic growth 
is  possibly  country-specific,  we  classify  our  sample  in  three  subsample  depending  upon the  
levels of economic development. Our results confirm that the effect of FDI, remittances and 
foreign aid on economic growth varies with the level of income. In the long-run, while the effect 
of FDI on economic growth is positive and significant in lower-middle-income and upper-
middle –income countries, the effect is non-significant in low-income countries. Remittances 
have a positive effect on economic growth in low-income countries but non-significant effects 
in lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income countries. With regard to foreign aid, the 
overall effect is negative and significant except in upper-middle-income countries where the 
effect is non-significant. In the short-run, FDI, remittances and foreign aid do not have any 
significant effect on economic growth. 
Globally, an important policy implication of this study is that African governments 
should implement policies that take into account the reality of each recipient economy. More 
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specifically,  studies  have  shown  that  aid  received  in  Africa  suffers  from  the  problem  of  
corruption. African countries therefore need to improve their governance in order to better 
manage the aid received and thus increase the economic benefit of aid. For remittances, studies 
have shown that much of the funds received are oriented towards the consumption of imported 
products. As a result, governments should put in place policies that encourage the production 
and consumption of local products. With regard to FDI, African countries should improve the 
business environment and establish a facilitating framework for both foreign and domestic 
investors. Several countries have already taken such measures, however, much remains to be 
done in this direction. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Table 7 List of countries 
Algeria   Guinea   Nigeria 
Benin  Guinea-Bissau Rwanda 
Botswana  Kenya  Senegal 
Burkina Faso  Lesotho  Seychelles 
Cabo Verde  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Cameroon  Madagascar  South Africa 
Comoros  Malawi  Sudan 
Congo, Rep.  Mali  Swaziland 
Cote d'Ivoire  Mauritius  Tanzania 
Djibouti  Morocco  Togo 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mozambique  Tunisia 
Ethiopia  Namibia  Uganda 
Ghana   Niger     
 
Appendix 2 
Table 8 Variables definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions (measurement) Sources 
GDP per capita growth GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Remittances  REMIT Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Foreign Aid ODA Net ODA received (% of GNI) World Bank (WDI) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Trade openness Trade The sum of exports and imports of goods and services  
(% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
Financial development M2 Money and quasi money  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
 
